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McElwain: The Application of the Law of Wills and of Gifts to War Bonds
NOTE AND COMMENT
THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF WILLS AND
OF GIFTS TO WAR BONDS
The United States is at war. It is attempting to furnish
"flit" to every crack on earth in order to exterminate a common and deadly insect which is threatening our very existence.
Estimates
Such an extermination will take a lot of "flit."
range as high as $331,600,000,000.' Governments have essentially two ways of obtaining such revenue, (1) by taxation and
(2) by borrowing. It is obvious that both means must be used
to raise a sum anywhere near the above figure.
Borrowing is usually considered easier than taxation because the individual feels that he is getting value received
for his contribution, and consequently is more willing to part
with his money. Towards this end, the Treasury Department
has issued what it terms the "series E" savings bonds for individual purchases up to $5,000 annually. The purchaser of
such bonds has an alternative of three forms; (1) the bond
issued to the individual alone, (2) the bond issued to A or B,
and (3) the bond issued to A payable on death to B. The apparent intent of the latter two forms is to establish coownership in the bond between the two named parties or to invest
one with the right of survivorship upon the death of the owner
and thus circumvent the necessity of probate proceedings in
the transfer of the bonds.
It is the purpose of this comment and the comment of Mr.
Milne' to inquire into the validity of these types of bonds and
to analyze them in the light of existing state law and decisions.
Mr. Milne approaches the problem on the theory that the bonds
constitute either a contract or a trust. This comment will consider the applicability of theories of gift, of will, or of joint
ownership in the bond.
According to Section 22 of the Second Liberty Bond Act,'
the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue United
States savings bonds which shall be subject to restrictions on
their transfer as he may from time to time prescribe. Under
this authority the Treasury Department has issued a circular'
in which it enumerates the forms which are used in the present issue. The Treasury Department has labeled one type of
'United States News, January 22, 1943, p. 45.
'Milne, The Applicability of Contract and Trust Theories to War
Bonds, 4 MONT. L. REv. (1943) P. 70.
348 STAT. 344 (1935), 31 U. S. C. A. §757 (c).
'U. S. TREASURY DEPT. CIRCuLAR No. 530 (1935). A revision of this
circular has recently been made containing substantially the same
material under different section numbering.
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bond the "coownership form," which states that during the
lives of both coowners the bond will be paid to either upon his
separate request without requiring the signature of the other
coowner; and upon payment to either coowner the other person shall cease to have any interest in the bond.' It also provides that upon the death of one coowner, the surviving coowner will be recognized as sole and absolute owner of the
bond, and payment will be made only to him.'
The second type of bond issued under this authority is
called the "beneficiary form." This bond must be registered
in the name of one person payable on his death to another
named person. If the owner dies without receiving payment,
the beneficiary will be recognized as the sole and absolute
owner of the bond, which in such case will be paid only to
him
OU. S. TREESUnY DEPT. CiRcuLAR No. 530 §315.32:
"(a) During the lives of both coowners.-During the lives of both
coowners the bond will be paid to either coowner upon his separate
request without requiring the signature of the other coowner; and
upon payment to either coowner the other person shall cease to have
any interest in the bond. The bond will also be paid to both coowners upon their joint request, in which case payment will be made
by check drawn to the order of both coowners in the form, for example, "A and B" and the check must be endorsed by both payees.
The bond will not be reissued in any form during the lives of both
coowners except as specifically provided in these regulations."
*U. S. TREASURY DEPT. CiRcuLAR No. 530, §315.32:
"(b)
After the death of one coowner.-If either coowner dies
without having presented and surrendered the bond for payment to
a Federal Reserve Bank or the Treasury Department, the surviving
coowner will be recognized by the Treasury Department as the sole
and absolute owner of the bond, and payment will be made only
to him: Provided, however, that if a coowner dies after he has properly executed the requesct for payment and after the bond has actually been received by a Federal Reserve Bank or the Treasury
Department, payment of the bond, or check if one has been Issued,
will be made to his estate (see Subpart P hereof). Upon proof of
the death of one coowner and appropriate request by the surviving
coowner the bond will be reissued in the name of such survivor
alone, or in his name with another individual as coowner, or in his
name payable on death to a designated beneficiary."
7
U. S. TREASURY DEPT. CIRCULAR No. 530, §315.36:
"Payment or reissue to beneficiary.-If the registered owner dies
without having presented and surrendered the bond for payment or
authorized reissue to a Federal Reserve Bank of the Treasury Department, and is survived by the beneficiary, upon proof of such
death and survivorship, the beneficiary will be recognized by the
Treasury Department as the sole and absolute owner of the bond,
and it will be paid only to him, or may be reissued in his name
alone, or otherwise reissued in accordance with Subpart J as though
it were registered in his name alone: Provided, however, That if
the bond with a properly executed request by the registered owner
for payment or authorized reissue has actually been received by a
Federal Reserve Bank or the Treasury Department, payment of the
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In Decker v. Fowler' decided in Washington in 1939, an
action was brought by Mrs. Decker, the beneficiary named in
a United States savings bond, to have the same stricken from
the inventory of the estate of the deceased. The bonds were
very similar to the present issue in that they were not transferable and no substitution could be made for the person named
therein as beneficiary; moreover, the owner of the bond could
have cashed the bonds during his life and thus have cut off
the beneficiary. The court held that Mrs. Decker could not
claim such bonds as a gift, notwithstanding her right to remain
as beneficiary until the bonds had been paid, since in view of
the right of the deceased to accept payment during his lifetime,
the proceeds of the bond did not pass beyond his control during his life. This case would seem to indicate that as to the
"beneficiary type" bond, a valid transfer had not been effected and the claims of the estate were superior to those of the
beneficiary concerning the ownership of such bonds. The case
was decided on the gift theory, and while the contract theory
was suggested in a dissenting opinion, the gift theory seemed
to be much better supported by authority.'
It is a well established principle of the law of personal
property that in order to constitute a valid "gift inter vivos"
of personal property, there must be a delivery, either actual
or symbolical. This delivery must divest the donor of present
control and dominion over the property absolutely and irrevocably, conferring such dominion and control either upon the
donee or some named third person.1
A similarity has been suggested between the problem herein involved with that involved in joint bank depositors' accounts.
In Bradford v. Eastman the owner of a bank deposit was about
to go on a visit. She caused her deposit to be put in the names
of herself and her niece, and gave possession of the deposit book
to the niece on the latter's promise to return it. It was held
bond, or check, if one has been issued, will be made to the estate of
the deceased owner in accordance with Sec. 315.49."
U. S. TREASURY DEPT. CIRCULAR No. 530, §315.35:

"A bond registered in the name of one person payable on death to
another may not be reissued during the latter's lifetime to eliminate
his name but may be reissued on request of the registered owner to
name beneficiary as coowner."
'Decker v. Fowler (1939) 199 Wash. 549, 92 P. (2d) 254.
'In re Slocum's Estate (1915) 83 Wash. 158, 145 P. 204;
In re McCoy's Estate (1937) 189 Wash. 103, 63 P. (2d) 522;
Shaw v. Camp (1896) 160 Ill. 425, 43 N. E. 608;
Hicks v. Meadows (1915) 193 Ala. 246, 69 So. 432.
"First National Bank v. Rutherford Trust Co. (1931) 109 N. J. Eq. 265,
157 A. 142; O'Brien v. O'Brien (1925) 112 Ohio St. 202, 147 N. E. 4.
"Bradford v. Eastman (1918) 229 Mass. 499, 118 N. E. 879.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1943

3

Montana Law Review, Vol. 4 [1943], Iss. 1, Art. 12
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
that, the owner's only intention being that the niece should make
her remittances as needed while away, and there being no intention to make a gift, as between the owner and her niece the
money belonged always and wholly to the former.
In Wolfe v. Hoefke " a niece came from Germany on money
advanced by her uncle, living at his home without charge. The
uncle deposited a sum with a bank to their joint account. He
made other deposits, stating his intention that the money should
in time belong to his niece. The Washington Court held that
owing to his retention of partial control over the account there
was no gift. The fact of deposit by the uncle under circumstances allowing the niece to withdraw the money did not imply that the money belong to her or that she had joint ownership in it.
A strong minority of courts hold that there is no valid
gift created when one sets up an account in which either he
or the donee may draw and appropriate the money without accounting therefor to the other. These courts reason that while
the donee has authority to withdraw all the funds, a like power also remains in the donor. And, therefore, the donor retains power and dominion over the intended gift.'
Applying the reasoning of these cases to the "beneficiary
type" bond, such a transfer would appear to be ineffective to
vest title in the beneficiary at death for three reasons: (1)
There does not appear to be an intent upon the part of the
owner of the bond to make a present gift since he maintains
the sole right to receive payment of the bond; only upon his
death does anything accrue to the beneficiary. (2) There is
no delivery of the bond either actual or symbolical to the beneficiary as donee. (3) Even though there be the necessary intent and delivery, there is not a valid gift because the donor
retains complete and singular control over the chose in action
as long as he lives, with no present interest whatsoever vested
in the beneficiary.
The "coownership type" bond is more difficult to reconcile with the gift theory because it is the apparent intent of the
government to attempt to vest some type of dual ownership
in the bond. This approach will be considered in detail later.
To assume an attempted gift, however, it would appear that
this type would likewise fail because of the lack of intent and
the fact that the donor, while vesting some control in the
'Wolfe v. Hoefke (1923) 124 Wash. 495, 214 P. 1047.
'Carr v. Carr (1911) 15 Cal. App. 480, 115 P. 261; Pearre v. Grossnickle
(1921)

139 Me. 274, 115 A. 49.
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donee (coowner), still keeps such dominion as would negative
any present gift according to the decision in Wolfe v. Hoefke.
It is quite clear that these bonds do not conform to the
requisites of a "testamentary disposition" as set out by the
Montana Code" for the following reasons: (1) The bond is
not subscribed to by the testator or by some person in his
presence and by his direction. (2) There are no attesting witnesses who acknowledge the bond to be the testator's last will
and testament. (3) There are no signatures by the two attesting witnesses at the end of the will. If such instruments
are intended as wills, it is paramount that they follow the requirements set up by the state statutes for disposing of such
property before such dispositions are considered valid transfers.
Application for the bond is made on a standard printed
form signed by the applicant designating the type and amount
desired in the bond.' Montana recognizes a holographic will
as a valid testamentary disposition." Requirements for such a
will, however, are that it be entirely written, dated, and signed
"R. C. M. 1935, §6980:
"Every will, other than a nuncupative will, must be in writing;
and every will, other than a holographic will, and a nuncupative
will, must be executed and attested as follows:
1. It must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself, or some person in his presence and by his direction must subscribe his name thereto;
2. The subscription must be made in the presence of the attesting
witnesses, or be acknowledged by the testator to them to have been
made by him or by his authority;
3. The testator must, at the time of subscribing or acknowledging
the same, declare to the attesting witnesses that the instrument in
his will; and,
4. There must be two attesting witnesses, each of whom must sign
his name as a witness, at the end of the will, at the testator's request, and in his presence.
"Application for the bond is made on Treasury Department Form PDE
1686 which states in printed form: "The undersigned hereby applies
for United States Defense Savings Bonds of Series E (issued pursuant
to Treasury Department Circular No. 653, dated April 15, 1941) as
follows:" (Here the applicant inserts the number of bonds desired
and the amount of each bond.) "Bonds to be inscribed as follows:"
(The choice of the three allowed forms is inserted here.)
The applicant then signs and dates the application and a receipt is given him by
the institution selling the bond. The bond is then issued in the desired
form with the name or names of the owners typed into a space allowed for the same in the bond. No signature of the owners appear
on the bond in any form; of course, the signature of the Secretary of
the Treasury appears thereon.
'OR. C. M. 1935, §6981:
"A holographic will is one that is entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made In or out of this state, and need not be witnessed."
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by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form. The Montana Court has been very strict in interpreting
this statute, holding that even the printed designation of the
year in a writing on a letterhead of the decedent rendered
such writing invalid as a holographic will even though all the
othcr requirements were fulfilled." The printed form of the
application for a bond would therefore seem to preclude the
application of such a theory in sustaining the transfer.
"The beneficiary type" bond appears to be an attempted
testamentary disposition. It recites that the bond belongs to
A, who during his lifetime has the sole right to any payments
and is collectible by B only upon A's death. Although B has
the right according to the regulations to remain as beneficiary
as long as the bond is outstanding, the fact that A may at any
time turn the bond in for payment and thus cut off the beneficiary renders B's right as beneficiary of no value or meaning. A need only turn in the bond for payment and have a
new bond issued, naming another beneficiary to cut off B.
A "vested interest" is one in which there is a present
fixed right either of present enjoyment or of future enjoyment."8 It is not the uncertainty of enjoyment in the future,
but the uncertainty of the right of enjoyment, which makes
the difference between a "vested"
and a "contingent"
interest. A's right to collect on the bonds during his life affects the "right of enjoyment" of B and therefore renders the
beneficiary's interest a contingent interest-contingent upon
A's death without having received payment. There being no
present right of the beneficiary in the bond, the clause "payable on death" would appear to be a testamentary disposition
which is invalid because it does not conform to the state requirements for such dispositions.
In Deyo v. Adams," which has been decided by the Supreme
Court of New York for Kings County and is at the present time
up on appeal, action was brought by the executrix of the estate
of the owner of United States bonds against the beneficiary
named in the bond to recover said bonds as part of the deceased's
estate. The bonds were of the "payable on death" type. The
argument of the beneficiary was that the Treasury Department's
regulations were controlling in the matter of the transfer. The
"In re Noyes' Estate (1909) 40 Mont. 190, 105 P. 1017.
"Nelson v. Nelson (1904) 36 Ind. App. 331, 72 N. E. 482.
"Mahoney v. Mahoney (1923) 98 Conn. 525, 120 A. 342.
*Deyo v. Adams (1942) 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 734, 178 Misc. 859. The United
States attempted to intervene in the Kings County Court, but their
petition was denied.
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court held that the regulations of the United States government
concerning the manner of issue and payment of the bonds did
not preclude the application of the laws of the state of New York
determining the validity of the devolution of property. These
regulations fix and determine exactly to whom the government
may make payment of the bonds, thereby relieving the government of suits and claims or controversies. The rights of all persons in relation to the bonds are governed by the same rules of
law as apply to bonds issued by a private corporation. Aside
from the directions and provisions as to manner and form of
payment, the federal laws create no distinction between the
bonds in question and other bonds. The court quoted Judge
Beals in the Decker case, "It seems to me clear that neither
Federal statutes nor the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Federal Department can render inoperative state laws governing the administration of the estate of a deceased citizen of
that state and the distribution of his property to the persons
entitled, under state laws, to receive the same, or the application of state laws providing for the payment of the debts of a
decedent out of his property."
In Rice v. Bennington County Savings Bank, in which
the ownership of a joint bank account was in dispute, the court
held that an order executed by the owner of a bank deposit,
"Pay to the order of A or B, or either, or the survivor of either
of them" did not create a joint tenancy or joint interest; moreover that the provisions of a statute' relating to the payment of
joint deposits, are for the protection of the bank paying money
to persons named in deposits made in the manner specified in
the statute, and do not change or affect the title to such deposit
as between the two parties. Such statutes are not controlling
upon the relative rights of the parties but are merely for the
protection of the bank in making payment to either of them.
These two cases seem to indicate that the regulations set
forth by the Treasury Department are merely for the protection
of the United States in making payment to either of the parties
named in the bond, and do not set forth the right of ownership
of the parties as between themselves which is determined by
"Rice v. Bennington County Savings Bank (1920) 93 Vt. 493, 108 A. 708.
'Montana has a similar statute, R. C. M. 1935, §6014.53:
"When a deposit has been made, or shall hereafter be made, in
any bank, in the name of two (2) persons, payable to either or payable to either or the survivor, such deposit, or any part thereof, or
any interest or dividend thereon, may be paid to either of said persons, whether the other be living or not; and the receipt or acquittance of the person so paid shall be a valid and sufficient release or
discharge to the bank for any payment so made."
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state law. The judgment in the Decker case was given in this
light. It directed the plaintiff (who was the beneficiary named
in the bond) to collect the money or the bonds from the Federal
Government and turn the same over to the administrator as part
of the assets of the estate.
The decision of the Court of Claims in Warren v. United
States" might easily be interpreted under this view and when so
interpreted is not contra to either the Decker or the Adams case.
The court merely held that the executrix of the owner's estate
was not entitled to payment of the bond from the United States
because payment to the beneficiary was in conformity to the
provisions of the contract entered into with the owner. The
court did not attempt to adjudicate the ownership of the money
derived from the bond. It merely decided to whom it was proper
to direct payment under the contract. It was then within the
province of a state court to decide such ownership as between
the beneficiary and the executrix of the estate.
In Sinift v. Sinift" in which the ownership of some United
States bonds was also in question, the court held that the Federal Liberty Loan Act providing that bonds authorized thereby
shall be in such forms and denominations and subject to such
terms and conditions of issue, conversion, and redemption as the
Secretary of Treasury may prescribe, did not authorize such officer to fix title to or ownership of the bonds or of the money
owing thereon. No power was given by the Treasury regulations
to provide for joint ownership with the right of survivorship in
bonds issued to two persons or to one person and his named survivor. In determining the rights of the testator's collateral
heirs to bank deposits and bonds listed in a will and executor's
inventory, the court held that the controlling factor was the
testator's intent, as established by the entire record considering
his life and conduct in general.'
The Treasury Department by its regulations seems to acknowledge that it does not attempt to define the respective
2'Warren v. United States (1929) 68 Ct. of Claims 634. This case involved a controversy between the beneficiary named in the bond and
the executrix of the deceased owner's estate. The court held that the
refusal by the Secretary of the Treasury to make payment to the executrix was in conformity with the provisions of the contract entered
into with the owner of the bond.
'Sinift v. Sinift (1940) 229 Iowa 56, 293 N. W. 841.
"This case seems to be contrary to Montana law laid down in In re
Sullivan's Estate (1941) 112 Mont. 519, 118 P. (2d) 383, in, which the
court held that a testatrix who had made a joint deposit with her
daughter could not later dispose of the account in her will, because
she had already put it out of her power so to do. Judge Angstman in
a strong dissenting opinion suggested the intent of the party as the
better approach.
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rights of the parties. The circulare states that conflicting claims
as to ownership of or interest in a savings bond, as between the
registered owner and the coowner or the registered owner and
the designated beneficiary may be determined by valid judicial
proceedings. In such a case the bond may be reissued in the
names of the respective coowners or the owner and the beneficiary to the extent of their respective interests as determined
by such proceedings.
The "coownership type" of bond appears to be an attempt
to create a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship in the
surviving coowner. The Montana Code defines a joint interest
as one owned by several persons in equal shares, by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the
will or transfer to be a joint tenancy' and declares that all other
interests are interests in common.' Under Montana law, therefore, it might well be contended that in these bonds an "interest
in common" is created because the bonds fail expressly to declare the interest to be joint, also that because a joint interest
has not been created, the right of survivorship is lost and the
bond must go through probate proceedings.
As before stated it is the intent of this comment to determine whether the present bond issue can be supported as a gift,
a will, or in joint ownership. Whether the issue may be upheld
on a contract or a trust theory is not considered herein. It is
the purpose of Mr. Milne in his comment to investigate the subject under these theories. Tremendous amounts are involved.
Much litigation has already ensued. With 48 probate jurisdictions in our federal union, there is opportunity for more. It is
the opinion of this writer that a better analysis of the problem
§315.52:
"Determination of interest as between owner and coowner or beneficiary.-Conflicting claims as to ownership of or interest in a savings bond, as between the registered owner and the coowner, or the
registered owner and a designated beneficiary may be determined
by valid judicial proceedings, in which case the bond may be reissued in the names of the respective coowners or the owner and
the beneficiary to the extent of their respective interests as determined by such proceedings, but only in authorized denominations."
2R.C. M. 1935, §680:
"A joint interest is one owned by several persons in equal shares
by a title created by a single will or transfer, when eopressly declared in the will or transfer to be a joint tenancy, or when granted
or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants."
'R. C. M. 1935, §6683:
"Every interest created in favor of several persons in their own
right, including husband and wife is an interest in common,
unless acquired by them in partnership, for partnership purposes, or
unless declared in its creation to be a joint interest as provided in
!6680."
2U. S. TREASURY DEPT. CIRCULAR No. 530,
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and a more thorough research into applicable state law might
have suggested to government attorneys the desirability of issue
of the bonds under conditions less litigious. "To A and B, not
as tenants in common, but as joint tenants with the right of survivorship" is fairly well recognized as creating an interest in
the survivor free from the necessity of probate. The present issues are yet to be tested. One does not like to buy into a law
suit, either for himself or for his successor in interest. With all
of their attractiveness in the present emergency, the bonds
might, under more conventional terms of issue, have been made
even more attractive to the buying public. And the social interest in saving the time of our already overburdened courts is a
matter not to be lightly considered.
-- Joe McElwain.
THE APPLICABILITY OF CONTRACT AND TRUST
THEORIES TO WAR BONDS
In its financing of the present war, the United States Government is currently issuing two types of bonds which are calulated to prove litigious. In the first, when A invests, the
bond provides that for a stated consideration, and at ten years
from date, the government will pay a certain sum to "A or B."
In the second, it will pay "to A, payable on his death to B."
The Government regulations make provision only for these
two tyes of "coownership" bonds. Controversy arises, when
upon A's death, A's estate seeks to prevail over B, on the theory that such a disposition is testamentary. According to state
laws on devolution of property, the estate prevails if the disposition is considered to be a gift.' It has been argued that
contract theories apply and that federal regulations should
prevail over state laws as regards devolution of property.! This
comment will attempt to consider the applicability of trust,,and
contract theories to the situation. Another comment in !his
issue treats the problem in so far as it involves applicability
of the law of wills and of gifts.
First, as to the contention that a trust is created, it is apparent that no express trust is found in the words used, since
the requisite manifestation of an intention is lacking. An express trust can be created only upon an outward expression of
1

Deyo v. Adams (1942) 36 N. Y. S. 734; Decker v. Fowler (1939) 199
Wash. 549, 92 P (2d) 254.
'Warren v. United States (1929) 68 Ct. Claims 634.
aMcElwain, The Application of the Law of Wills and of Gift8 to War
Bonds. 4 MONT. L. REv. 61 (1943).
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